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BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
This article is about "P.E." Not the physical education class that you
looked forward to in junior high school, but the two "P.E.'s" you dreaded in
your first-year law school contracts class: (1) promissory estoppel and
(2) the parol evidence rule.' Each is plenty complicated standing alone.
This article considers what happens if the two bump into each other. More
specifically, this article asks and answers the question: Should the parol
evidence rule apply to promissory estoppel cases?
This is not the first law review article to explore the relationship of
promissory estoppel and the parol evidence rule. The most-cited such
article is an eighty-five page article in the 1983 Vanderbilt Law Review by
2Professor Michael B. Metzger, currently the Jean Ann and Donald E.
Foster Chair in Business Ethics at the Indiana University's Kelley School of
Business.3
With all due respect,4 we believe that Professor Metzger improperly
framed the question as, "Should promissory estoppel apply to parol
evidence cases?" instead of, "Should the parol evidence rule apply to
promissory estoppel cases?" 5 There is no such thing as a "parol evidence
case." There are, however, promissory estoppel cases.
As was pointed out by Melinda, Kelly, and the editors of the Baylor Law Review, this is a
sentence fragment. Not the only sentence fragment in this article that Melinda, Kelly, and the
editors of the Baylor Law Review have spotted. Over their objections, the sentence fragments
remain as a form of tribute to Miss Alice Lindemann, Epstein's eleventh grade "Language Arts"
teacher who told him that, in the highly unlikely event he ever became a published author, he
could then use sentence fragments.
2Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 36
VAND. L. REv. 1383 (1983). More recently, the Ohio Northern University Law Review published
a short article by Professor Gregory Scott Crespi of the Dedman School of Law, Southern
Methodist University, with the long title, "Clarifying the Boundary Between the Parol Evidence
Rule and the Rules Governing Subsequent Oral Modifications." 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 71 (2008).
Like the title, the first sentence of the article indicates that the question addressed in the article is:
"What rules govern whether an oral agreement that purports to modify a written contract is legally
effective?" Id. at 71. There are, however, a few brief statements in the article relevant to the
question of whether the parol evidence rule should apply to promissory estoppel cases. See id. at
79.
3 Indiana University, Alliance of Distinguished and Titled Professors,
http://www.indiana.edu/-alldrp/members/metzger.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
4 And, we understand that a lot of respect is due an academic chairholder. See, e.g., John
Attanasio, Judge James Noel Dean and Professor of Law and William Hawley Atwell Chair of
Constitutional Law, and Bradley J. B. Toben, Dean and M.C. Mattie Caston Chair in Law, Baylor
University.
5Metzger, supra note 2, at 1454.
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What is a promissory estoppel case? "Under Texas law, a plaintiff
alleging promissory estoppel must establish (1) a promise; (2) foreseeab[le]
reliance thereon by the promisor; [and] (3) substantial reliance thereon by
the promisee."6 Assume' that, in a promissory estoppel claim, "Simmons
contends that HPN orally promised a long-term business relationship on
more than one occasion, and that Simmons relied upon those promises
when it expanded its facilities in 1995 and 1996 to produce 'low ash'
poultry meal."8 It would seem that the litigable issues would be whether:
(1) HPN made such promises; (2) HPN should have foreseen that Simmons
would rely on the promises; and (3) Simmons' reliance was substantial.
Now, just like law school, let's play "change the facts." 9 Let's add facts
that might raise parol evidence rule concerns.
Professor Arthur Corbin provided one of the more accessible
explanations of the parol evidence rule:
When two parties have made a contract and have
expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented
as the complete and accurate integration of that contract,
evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent
understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for
the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.'o
Professor Corbin uses the term "integration" in listing the facts that trigger
the parol evidence rule." Texas courts and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts use similar language and define an integrated agreement as an
agreement that is in writing and intended by the parties as the final
expression of their agreement.12 To summarize, the existence of both (1) a
6Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). Accord Henry Schein, Inc. v.
Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 686 n.25 (Tex. 2002).
This hypothetical is not hypothetical. Instead, we are taking part of the facts from one of our
favorite cases, Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc., 270 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 2001), and
part from our favorite law school case book, DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL &
LAWRENCE PONOROFF, MAKING AND DOING DEALS (2d ed. 2006).
8Simmons, 270 F.3d at 727.
9 Cf Orin S. Kerr, How to Read a Judicial Opinion: A Guide for New Law Students 6 (2005),
http://euro.ecom.cmu.edulprogram/law/08-732/Courts/howtoreadv2.pdf (explaining how changing
the facts can help law students understand the scope and effect of a court's decision).
1o Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 603 (1944).
" See id.
12See Royce Homes, L.P. v. Bates, No. 01-08-00191-CV, 2010 WL 184216, at *9 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 21, 2010, no pet.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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final written agreement and (2) some prior agreement that does not appear
in the written contract are necessary to trigger the parol evidence rule.13
Accordingly, if, in our "hypo," Simmons "subsequently entered into
one-year written contracts with HPN,"l 4 then we have our question: Should
the parol evidence rule apply in promissory estoppel cases? A judge will
confront this question when HPN moves for summary judgment. In the
case that inspired our hypothetical (and this article), Judge H. Franklin
Waters, an outstanding federal district judge," held that the alleged
promises of a long-term relationship were barred by the parol evidence
rule.'6 This holding was subsequently affirmed by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.'7
Texas lawyers and judges have considered the relationship of
promissory estoppel and the parol evidence rule. Not often. Not
consistently. Two recent decisions by the courts of appeals are
representative.
Gonzalez v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America
Local 551 involved the written contract for a sale of land owned by a union
for $550,000 and a 6% realtor's commission.' 8  The written contract
expressly conditioned sale on approval by union members: "[S]eller's
obligation to sell the property is subject to" approval by the union
members.' 9 Union members did not approve the sale.20 Gonzalez, the
purchaser, nonetheless, sued for specific performance, asserting, inter alia,
"breach of contract" and "promissory and equitable estoppel." 2 1 Gonzalez
alleged that, prior to the sale, he had been told by the union representation
he was negotiating with that he was authorized by the members to accept an
offer of $550,000 and a 6% realtor's commission.22 In affirming the trial
court's decision of summary judgment for the union, the Fourteenth Court
§ 209(1) (1981).
'3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213.
14Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc., 270 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 2001).
5 See generally Jimm Larry Hendren, Tribute to Judge H. Franklin Waters, 56 ARK. L. REV.
5 (2003).
16 Simmons, 270 F.3d at 727.
'71d.
"93 S.W.3d 208, 209 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
'9 Id. at 209-10.





of Appeals in Houston concluded that the alleged statement of the union
representative was inadmissible parol evidence and held that "Gonzalez
may not, therefore, admit the statement under the guise of equitable or
promissory estoppel."23
A couple of years earlier, in an opinion not designated for publication,
the First Court of Appeals in Houston reached the same ultimate result,
using different reasoning. In Aminian v. Woodward-Clyde Consultants,
Inc., Aminian signed a written employment agreement that contained an at-
will provision: "[M]y employment may be terminated at will at any time,
and with or without cause"; he then resigned his job in Houston and started
working for the defendant in New Zealand. 24 When Aminian was
terminated, he sued for breach of contract, fraud, promissory estoppel,
misrepresentation, and bad faith. 25  Aminian asserted that, prior to his
signing the agreement, the defendant told him that the at-will provision was
only a formality, "trust him."2 6  In affirming the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendant, the Houston court said, "Appellees
moved for summary judgment on appellant's promissory estoppel and
negligent misrepresentation claims because they were barred by the statute
of frauds, parol evidence rule, and lack of reliance. These claims fail for
the reason discussed above, i.e., lack ofjustifiable reliance."27
In understanding and assessing these Texas decisions and other cases
that raise the question of whether the parol evidence rule applies to
promissory estoppel cases, we need to know more about (1) promissory
estoppel; (2) the parol evidence rule; and (3) reported decisions from Texas
and other states.
23Id. at 211. Similar statements can be found in Hughes v. Sams, No. H-07-0671, 2008 WL
4724436, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2008); Stavert Props., Inc. v. Republic Bank of N. Hills,
696 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and Joseph v. Mahoney
Corp., 367 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24No. 01-98-01428-CV, 2001 WL 493174, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 10,
2001, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
25Id. at *2. Promissory estoppel is often invoked in employment disputes, especially
employment-at-will relationships. Cortlan H. Maddux, Comment, Employers Beware! The
Emerging Use of Promissory Estoppel as an Exception to Employment at Will, 49 BAYLOR L.
REv. 197, 198 (1997).
26Aminian, 2001 WL 493174, at *2.





We 28 know the history of promissory estoppel. Less than a hundred
years of history and hundreds of pages of law review articles explore that
history.29 Everyone agrees that the late Professor Samuel Williston of the
Harvard Law School "invented" the term "promissory estoppel."30 The
term first appeared in Williston's 1920 treatise on contracts.
Williston's choice of the words "promissory estoppel" in his treatise is
understandable, but regrettable. Contract law would be much less
confusing if Williston had chosen the phrase, "reliance on a promise
contracts" or even just "Sam's contracts" instead of "promissory estoppel."
More specifically, it is Williston's choice of the word "estoppel" that has
proved to be problematic.
In the law, the word "estoppels" generally connotes a reaction rather
than an action. Estoppel is asserted to prevent the other party from raising a
claim, rather than to raise a claim. 32 Williston's use of the word "estoppel"
in "promissory estoppel" is at least in part responsible for statements such
as the following statement from DeWitt v. Fleming: "[I]n Illinois
promissory estoppel is available only as a defense ( i.e., as a shield), not as
a cause of action ( i.e., as a sword)."3 3 Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court
28Not "we" as in "David, Melinda, and Kelly," but a more general "we" as in, "We hold these
truths to be.. . ." Cf Tongue Twisters, THE ECONOMIST, Dec.19, 2009, at 137, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/intemational/displaystory.cfm?storyid=15108609 (last visited
Mar. 30, 2010) ("In Kwaio, spoken in the Solomon Islands, 'we' has two forms: 'me and you'
and 'me and someone else (but not you).").
29The two most comprehensive articles on the history of promissory estoppel are: Joel M.
Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel: The Life History of an Ideal Legal Transplant, 41 U. RICH. L. REV.
425 (2007), and Kevin M. Teeven, Origins of Promissory Estoppel: Justifiable Reliance and
Commercial Uncertainty Before Williston's Restatement, 34 U. MEM. L. REv. 499 (2004).
30 See Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the
Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459, 459 n.l (1950) ("The writer has made a careful search to
discover the pioneer in the use of the term 'promissory estoppel.' Apparently, the term was first
used in I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 139 (1st ed. 1920). See Note, 13 IOWA L. REv. 332, 333
(1928)."). We also made a careful search.
311 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 139, at 308 (1st ed. 1920).
32 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 629 (9th ed. 2009).
13828 N.E.2d 756, 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). See generally Collin F. Richmond, Case Note,
Promissory Estoppel - Only a Shield, Not a Sword?: Analysis of Dewitt v. Fleming, 828 N.E.2d
756 (Ill. App. 5th 2005), 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 735 (2007).
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repudiated DeWitt, stating, "recognizing promissory estoppel as an
affirmative cause of action ... is consistent with decisions of other
courts."34
Not "recognizing promissory estoppel as an affirmative cause of action"
is also "consistent with ... decisions of other courts."35 And, Texas courts
have been equivocal as to whether promissory estoppel can be the basis for
an affirmative claim. Consider the following language from the seminal
Texas Supreme Court decision on promissory estoppel, Wheeler v. White:
As to the argument that no new cause of action may be
created by such a promise regardless of its established
applicability as a defense, it has been answered that where
one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a
promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal
relations between them and to be acted on accordingly,
then, once the other party has taken him at his word and
acted on it, the party who gave the promise cannot
afterward be allowed to revert to the previous relationship
as if no such promise had been made. This does not create
a contract where none existed before, but only prevents a
party from insisting upon his strict legal rights when it
would be unjust to allow him to enforce them.
The function of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is,
under our view, defensive in that it estops a promisor from
denying the enforceability of the promise.3 6
In that case, Wheeler alleged that he detrimentally relied on White's
promise, contained in a written agreement and supported by consideration,
to obtain or furnish a loan to finance construction of a shopping center on
Wheeler's land.37 White's position was that the written contract was
34Newton Tractor Sales, Inc., v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 906 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ill. 2009). See
also Alaska Trademark Shellfish, LLC v. State, 172 P.3d 764, 766 n.8 (Alaska 2007) (explaining
that promissory estoppel is "offensive, and can be used for affirmative enforcement of a promise"
whereas equitable estoppel is defensive).
3 5E.g., Dealers Supply Co. v. Cheil Indus., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 579, 586-87 (M.D.N.C.
2004); Grubb & Ellis Co. v. Potomac Med. Bldg., L.L.C., No. 1:08cv971(GBL), 2009 WL
3 175999, at *10 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2009).





unenforceable as it was too indefinite.38  The lower courts agreed with
White.3 9 The Texas Supreme Court did not disagree with White's and the
lower courts' position on indefiniteness, but it nonetheless reversed, under
the theory of promissory estoppel.4 0 As the court explains in the language
quoted above, it was using promissory estoppel defensively to "estop[] a
promisor [White] from denying the enforceability [on the ground of
indefiniteness] of the promise [to provide financing]."4 1
Later decisions of the Texas courts of appeals have read Wheeler as
supporting the proposition that promissory estoppel may be the basis for an
affirmative claim.42 While it can be questioned whether recognizing
promissory estoppel as an affirmative cause of action is consistent with the
position of the Texas Supreme Court in Wheeler, it is consistent with what
Williston intended to accomplish with the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.43
Williston intended that promissory estoppel be the basis for an
affirmative claim. Williston suggested the term "promissory estoppel" as a





4 1Id. at 96.
42See, e.g., Bechtel Corp. v. CITGO Prods. Pipeline Co., 271 S.W.3d 898, 926 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2008, no pet.) (citing Wheeler) (stating that "promissory estoppel may be the basis for an
affirmative claim"); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Carr, 886 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1994,
writ denied) (referencing Wheeler) (explaining that "[p]romissory estoppel is available as a cause
of action to someone who has reasonably relied to his detriment on an otherwise unenforceable
promise").
43Maddux, supra note 25, at 225 ("Both Gold Kist and Henderson based their holdings that
promissory estoppel was a cause of action on the Texas Supreme Court's language in Wheeler v.
White. Careful examination of the language in Wheeler, however, shows that the court viewed
promissory estoppel as defensive in nature. Thus, the Gold Kist and Henderson courts based their
determination that promissory estoppel was a cause of action on language that did not clearly
support their position. These holdings exemplify the current confusion as to the nature of
promissory estoppel and show the current need for the Texas Supreme Court to define how Texas
courts should apply the doctrine."). See also Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases ofPromissory
Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45, 59 (1996) (referring to "[t]he Texas Supreme Court's
defensive application of promissory estoppel" in Wheeler); Patterson v. Long Beach Mortgage
Co., No. 3:07-CV-1602-O-BH, 2009 WL 4884151, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2009) (citing
Wheeler) ("The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a defensive doctrine that estops a promisor




misrepresentation which has the "defensive" effect of negating denial of the
truth of the representation, and reliance upon a gratuitous promise which
had the "offensive" effect of creating an enforceable promise." Since most
courts at that time took the position that detrimental reliance on a promise
did not satisfy the consideration requirement,4 5 courts were finding
consideration where there likely was none in order to enforce charitable
46subscriptions. Dissatisfied with this approach, a few courts were
enforcing charitable promises on the grounds of estoppel.47 Williston
posited that this approach to charitable subscriptions depended on reliance
on a promise as a substitute for consideration.48
Williston suggested that: (1) justifiable reliance on a promise, rather
than bargained-for promises, might historically be the true basis of informal
contracts, and (2) gratuitous promises would satisfy the consideration
requirement so long as either the promisor gained a benefit or the promisee
suffered a detriment due to reasonable reliance on the promise.49 Williston
acknowledged that recognizing reliance rather than bargained-for
consideration as a basis for contract liability would greatly expand liability
for promises and admitted that reported cases did not support this shift.o
Likely because of these widespread implications and his desire to teach
what the law is rather than what the law should be,51 Williston did not
" WILLISTON, supra note 31, § 139, at 307-08.
45 See id. § 139, at 308. See also E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical
Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 576, 598 (1969) (explaining that gratuitous
promises cannot be enforced under the doctrine of consideration since nothing is given in
exchange).
46Some courts held that the promises of other subscribers served as consideration. 1
WILLISTON, supra note 31, § 116, at 251-52 (citing, among other cases, Allen v. Duffy, 4 N.W.
427 (Mich. 1880) (allowing the mutual promise of multiple subscribers to serve as consideration
for a charitable subscription)). Other courts held that an implied promise by the beneficiary to
apply the contributions properly served as consideration. Id. § 116, at 252 (referring, in part, to
Irwin v. Lombard Univ., 46 N.E. 63 (Ohio 1897) (finding consideration where the donee
university continued the "educational enterprise" donors had sought to promote with their
contributions)). However, neither view reflects a reasonable interpretation of the facts.
47 Id. § 116, at 253 (citing, for example, Simpson Coll. v. Tattle, 33 N.W. 74, 74, 76 (Iowa
1887) (discussing estopping a donor from claiming lack of consideration to avoid payment of a
promised donation)).
481Id. § 116, at 252-53. It is worth noting that Williston's Section 139 is entitled, "Estoppel as
a substitute for consideration." Id. § 139, at 307.
49Id. § 139, at 313.
501d.
s M. Arbuckle & K. Flanagan note: Professor Epstein showed no such restraint in our IL
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explore this line of thought in his materials for law students. 5 2
B. Restatement of Contracts
Williston did, however, vigorously pursue this line of thought with the
American Law Institute in his work as Reporter for the Restatement of
Contracts.53 But not without opposition.
Professor Arthur Corbin of the Yale Law School, viewed as Williston's
"rival," initially espoused a different view of reliance on a promise as a
basis for contract liability.5 4 Corbin argued that the doctrine of
consideration was flexible enough to include reliance not bargained for.
In other words, he felt that justifiable reliance on a gratuitous promise could
satisfy the consideration requirement. 6 Corbin wrote:
Indeed, there are many cases justifying the statement that
consideration may consist of acts of reliance upon a
promise even though they were not specified as the agreed
equivalent and inducement, provided the promisor ought to
have foreseen that such action would take place and the
promisee reasonably believes it to be desired.
If Corbin's position regarding reliance as consideration had prevailed,
then law professors (and the occasional law students) would not be writing
articles about promissory estoppels, and lawyers in Texas and other states
Contracts class, challenging us to learn, not memorize, the law and engaging us in frequent
Socratic examination of whether the Restatement (Second) of Contracts represents current law or
what the law should be. This article represents a further examination.
52Williston's anthology reflected his preference to teach students what the courts had done
rather than what they might do. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the
Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1406, 1457 (1987).
53Daniel J. Klau, Note, What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of
Contracts, 70 B.U. L. REv. 511, 531 (1990).
54See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the "Law of
Satisfaction "-A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 362 n.67 (1995). But cf SAMUEL
WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW 312 (1940) ("My greatest indebtedness was to Arthur Corbin. His
mastery of contracts law was only equaled by his generosity in contributing his best efforts to a
work [the Restatement of Contracts] that would for the most part pass under another's name.").
See generally Klau, supra note 53.
ss See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 193, at 278 (1 vol. ed. 1952).
561d.
5 7wILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 124 n. 1 (Arthur L. Corbin
ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919).
406 [Vol. 62:2
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would not be pleading separate causes of action based on (1) contracts and
(2) promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be
superfluous today. Instead, Corbin and the rest of us had to settle for the
more conservative recognition of reliance in Section 90 of the Restatement
as a possible substitute for consideration rather than consideration itself.5 9
Restatement Section 90 provides, "A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise."6 0
Even though Williston coined the term "promissory estoppel" and used
it in his treatise on contracts, Restatement Section 90 does not use the term
"promissory estoppel." 6 1 And, even though Restatement Section 90 at most
restated existing law as to charitable subscriptions and gratuitous bailments,
courts have used Section 90 more generally and have generally used the
term "promissory estoppel."62
C. Reliance Damages
The landmark Yale Law Journal article on damages for breach of
contract by Professor Lon Fuller and law student William Perdue, Jr.,6' has
played a large part in defining the type of damages associated with
58Recall that in Gonzalez and Aminian, the plaintiffs asserted a claim based on contract and a
claim based on promissory estoppel. Gonzalez v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 93 S.W.3d
208, 210 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Aminian v. Woodward-Clyde
Consultants, Inc., No. 01-98-01428-CV, 2001 WL 493174, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
May 10, 2001, pet. denied).
59See CORBIN, supra note 55, § 193, at 278-79; Ngugi, supra note 29, at 442 ("Needless to
say, it was the Willistonian solution that prevailed."). For a discussion as to whether it was
Corbin or Williston that "had to settle," see GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 62-72
(1974). But cf Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 247-
48 (2005). Does this footnote remind you of the Harvard-Yale football game? Kind of limited
interest.
60 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90, at 110 (1932).
6 1 See generally id.
62 Williston's study of cases for the Restatement was limited to charitable subscription and
gratuitous bailment cases. AM. L. INST., COMMENTARIES ON CONTRACTS: RESTATEMENT NO. 2,
at 19-20 (1926).
6 3See generally L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
2010] 407
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promissory estoppel.64 Fuller and Perdue first proposed that there were
three different types of contract damages: (1) expectation damages;
(2) reliance damages; and (3) restitution damages.65  They claimed that
66
reliance damages were the most appropriate remedy for Section 90 cases.
Fuller and Perdue explained that the reasons favoring expectation
damages did not apply in these cases because the promise of such promises
rarely gave up other opportunities and the enforcement of such promises did
not encourage economic utility as commercial transactions did. 7
Furthermore, since promissory estoppel cases usually involve a definite
sum of money, they contended that administration of reliance damages
would be most straightforward for courts.
Fuller and Perdue's reasons for so limiting Section 90 damages are
premised on Williston's initial view of the limited role of Section 90.69
Their reasoning seems right-on in enforcing charitable subscriptions and
gratuitous bailments. Neither Section 90 nor the Fuller and Perdue reliance
damages approach to promissory estoppel has, however, been so limited.
For example, in Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd., a case involving
an employment contract and not a charitable subscription or gratuitous
bailment, the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, held that the plaintiff had
failed to prove recoverable damages in his promissory estoppel claim since
none of his damages were reliance damages: 70
Zenor has produced no sufficient evidence that he suffered
any damages legally available under a promissory estoppel
theory of recovery. Under Texas law, only reliance
damages are recoverable for a promissory estoppel claim.
The jury awarded Zenor damages for mental anguish, past
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d, at 244 (1981) (sanctioning
reliance damages for promissory estoppel cases as endorsed by Fuller and Perdue); Jay M.
Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 305-06 (1992)
(explaining that Section 90 became known for protecting reliance rather than endorsing promises
due to Fuller and Perdue's article); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis ofSection
90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 119 (1991) (attributing the rejection by many commentators of Williston's
approach to Section 90 damages to publication of Fuller and Perdue's article on damages).
65 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 63, at 54.




69See id. at 64.
70176 F.3d 847, 865-66 (5th Cir. 1999).
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lost earnings and/or benefits, and future lost earnings
and/or benefits. These awards represent compensatory and
expectancy interests; none can be categorized as reliance
damages.71
Professor Warren Seavey of the Harvard Law School offered an equally
unpersuasive reason for limiting promissory estoppel damages to reliance
damages. He argues that the essence of a promissory estoppel claim is "not
primarily in depriving the plaintiff of the promised reward but in causing
the plaintiff to change his position to his detriment." 72 Professor Seavey's
argument is based on the premise that the focus of promissory estoppel is
the reliance and not the promise.73 While Seavey's premise is debatable, it
is certainly not Williston's premise.
During the 1926 proceedings of the American Law Institute, an
unidentified lawyer posed a hypothetical for Williston. Uncle promises to
give Nephew $1,000.76 In reliance on that promise, Nephew buys a car for
$500.77 If Uncle is not just a promise maker but also a promise breaker, and
Nephew sues, what does the Nephew recover, $1,000 or $500?78 Williston
responded that Uncle would be liable for $1,000, the amount of his
n Id. While we can and do question whether Texas courts are right on the law in limiting
recovery to reliance damages, there is no question that the Fifth Circuit is right on the Texas law.
E.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965); Bechtel Corp. v. CITGO Prods. Pipeline
Co., 271 S.W.3d 898, 926 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.). But see Jackson v. Morse, 871
A.2d 47, 51-52 (N.H. 2007) (explaining that expectation damages is the presumed remedy for
promissory estoppel unless "awarding so much would be inequitable"). The New Hampshire
Supreme Court references the contractual nature of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and its
emphasis on "full-scale enforcement by normal remedies" for most promissory estoppel claims.
Id. at 52 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. d). Almost sixty years after Fuller
and Perdue's article on reliance damages, another article in the Yale Law Journal challenged the
notion of reliance damages in promissory estoppel cases. See generally Yorio & Thel, supra note
64. Fordham University Professors Steve Thel and Edward Yorio argue that courts usually award
expectation damages enforcing the promise rather than reliance damages protecting the reliance.
Id. at 113-14.




74See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Death ofReliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1996).







promise.7 9 Frederic Coudert, of the famous Coudert Brothers law firm,so
challenged Williston's answer:
MR. COUDERT: Allow me to trespass once more, Mr.
Reporter, by asking this question. Please let me see if I
understand it rightly. Would you say, Mr. Reporter, in your
case of Johnny and the uncle, the uncle promising the
$1000 and Johnny buying the car-say, he goes out and
buys the car for $500-that uncle would be liable for $1000
or would he be liable for $500?
MR. WILLISTON: If Johnny had done what he was
expected to do, or is acting within the limits of his uncle's
expectation, I think the uncle would be liable for $1000;
but not otherwise.
MR. COUDERT: In other words, substantial justice
would require that uncle should be penalized in the sum of
$500.
MR. WILLISTON: Why do you say "penalized"?
MR. COUDERT: Because substantial justice there
would require, it seems to me, that Johnny get his money
for his car, but should he get his car and $500 more? I
don't see.81
MR. WILLISTON: Either the promise is binding or it is
not. If the promise is binding it has to be enforced as it is
made.8 2
79ld.
80 See generally ASIL Presidents: Frederic Ren6 Coudert,
http://www.asil.org/presidents/CoudertF.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2010); VIRGINIA KAYS
VEENSWIJK, COUDERT BROTHERS: A LEGACY IN LAW: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST
INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM (1994).




D. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
The Restatement (Second) takes a middle ground on whether
enforcement of a promise that induces reliance requires an award of
expectation damages as Williston argued or reliance damages as Texas
courts insist. Section 90 now contains the additional sentence: "The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires." 84
Unlike the Restatement, the Restatement (Second) Section 90 also
contains comments, and Comment d is especially instructive. For example,
Comment d states that "the same factors which bear on whether any relief
should be granted also bear on the character and extent of the remedy. In
particular, relief may sometime be limited to ... damages ... measured by
the extent of the promisee's reliance rather than the terms of the promise."ss
More important, that same Comment earlier states, "A promise binding
under this section is a contract, and full-scale enforcement by normal
remedies is often appropriate." 8 6  That Comment is important because
commentators and courts question whether a promise binding by reason of
promissory estoppel is a contract and whether contract law principles
should apply to promissory estoppel.
E. Contract Law or Tort Law
Remember that the phrase "promissory estoppel" was first used by a
contracts scholar in his contracts treatise, in a section entitled, "Estoppel as
a substitute for consideration." 87  Moreover, that contracts scholar,
Williston, as the Reporter for the Restatement of Contracts, was
instrumental in making reliance on a promise a part of the Restatement of
Contracts. There can be no question that Williston regarded a promise
binding by reason of reliance to be a contract and subject to contract law
principles. Consider his statement during the American Law Institute
Proceedings leading up to the Restatement:
83 See Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of
Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 55-58 (1981).
8 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (emphasis added).
85Id. § 90 cmt. d, at 244.
86 Id. (emphasis added).
871 WILLISTON, supra note 31, § 139, at 307. It is equally clear that Corbin also viewed
promissory estoppel as a part of contract law. See CORBIN, supra note 55, Ch. 8 (entitled,
"Reliance on a Promise as Ground for Enforcement").
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I should say anything was truly contractual where a
promisor makes a promise and that promise is
enforced ... of contract in the first part of the section [of
the Restatement] is a binding promise. If any law in any
state says that a promise is binding under certain
circumstances, then that promise is a contract.88
And, as noted above, Comment d to Restatement (Second) takes the
,,89same position: "A promise binding under this section is a contract ....
Also consider the language and structure of Restatement (Second) Section
17:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the formation of a
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation
of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.
(2) Whether or not there is a bargain a contract may be
formed under special rules applicable to formal contracts or
under the rules stated in §§ 82-94.90
Note that Section 17 is the first section in a chapter entitled, "Formation of
Contracts - Mutual Assent."9'
Notwithstanding this unequivocal history, for at least sixty years, law
professors have been equivocal about whether the basis for liability in
promissory estoppel is contract or tort.92 The most influential of these
professors, 93 Yale Law Professor Grant Gilmore in his 1974 book, The
Death of Contract, suggested that contract law in general is "being
reabsorbed into the mainstream of tort" and used Restatement Section 90 as
his primary example.94
In his revision of a volume of Corbin on Contracts, Professor Eric Mills
Holmes concluded that the majority of American jurisdictions have
8 8Proceedings at Fourth Annual Meeting, supra note 75, at 94-95 (quoting Samuel
Williston).
89
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d.
90Id. § 17 (emphasis added).
9 1Id.
92See generally, e.g., Orvill C. Snyder, Promissory Estoppel as Tort, 35 IOWA L. REV. 28
(1949).
9 3At least, most influential with other law professors.
94GILMORE, supra note 59, at 87-90.
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accepted promissory estoppel as an independent right from contract. 95 He
explained that the doctrine is in its tort stage when courts focus on "the
promisee's right to rely and the promisor's duty to prevent foreseeable
reliance" rather than the enforceability of the promise.96 Holmes noted that
these courts' tendencies to award reliance damages for the harm suffered
rather than expectation damages for the unfulfilled promise resembled the
tort approach to righting wrongs.97
A number of other law professors have also linked promissory estoppel
with tort law, not contract law.98 However, probably more law professors
than judges have linked promissory estoppel with tort.99 Consider, for
example, the recent statements of the Ninth Circuit in Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc., explaining that "'[p]romissory estoppel' is not a 'cause of action' in
itself [in most states]; rather it is a subset of a theory of recovery based on a
breach of contract." 00 Later in that same opinion, the court explains,
"Though promissory estoppel lurks on the sometimes blurry boundary
between contract and tort, its promissory character distinguishes it from
tort." 0'
953 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.11, at 53-54 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,
West Publishing Co. 1996) (1950). See also Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory
Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 45, 70 (1996).
963 HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 95, § 8.11, at 53.
9 7See id. § 8.11, at 54.
98 See, e.g., Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW:
NEW ESSAYS 118, 177 (Peter Benson ed. 2001) ("Promissory estoppel is not a species of
contractual liability ... Reliance-based liability, including promissory estoppel, is best understood
as a species of tort, not contractual, liability."); Avery Katz, When Should An Offer Stick? The
Economics ofPromissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1254 (1996)
("The doctrine of promissory estoppel is commonly explained as promoting the same purposes as
the tort of misrepresentation: punishing or deterring those who mislead others to their detriment
and compensating those who are misled.").
9 Professor Marco Jimenez of Stetson University Law School examined more than 300
promissory estoppel cases decided between January 1, 1981, and January 1, 2008, and concluded
"for better or worse, many judges are conceptualizing promissory estoppel actions as fully
contractual causes of action." Marco Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An
Empirical Analysis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REv. 3
(forthcoming 2010).
'00570 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009).
"" Id. at 1107 n.14. See also Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Edwards Movers, Inc., No. 08 C 3186,
2009 WL 1579520, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2009) (discussing "[p]romissory estoppel, which is not
a species of tort but, rather, is grounded in the principles of contract"); Louis & Karen Metro
Family, L.L.C. v. Lawrenceburg Conservancy, No. 4:06-cv-177-WGH-DFH, 2009 WL 1196938,
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If promissory estoppel were a form of tort and not a form of contract,
then it would be arguable that contract concepts such as the parol evidence
rule would not apply to causes of action invoking promissory estoppel. 10 2
Only arguable. Reported cases are divided as to whether the parol evidence
rule is limited to contract claims or applies to any claim arising from a
contractual relationship. 0 3
Perhaps, promissory estoppel is neither a form of tort nor a form of
contract. In Eagle Metal Products, L.L. C. v. Keymark Enterprises, L.L. C.,
Judge Barbara Lynn recently wrote:
The promissory estoppel claim is of a different order
from the tort claims. Promissory estoppel is a quasi-
contract theory which seeks to hold a party responsible for
promises that induced justifiable reliance on another. This
cause of action applies when a contract does not exist, but
equity compels enforcement of the promise. 104
And if, as Judge Lynn writes, promissory estoppel is neither a form of
tort nor a form of contract, then is it still arguable that contract concepts
such as the parol evidence rule would not apply to causes of action invoking
promissory estoppel. 0 5  There are reported cases on both sides of the
question whether promissory estoppel is "contract enough" that (1) the
at *9 (S.D. Ind. May 1, 2009) ("This doctrine [promissory estoppel] sounds in contract, is not a
tort . . . .").
1See Extra Equipamentos e Exportagilo Ltda. v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir.
2008).
103 Compare Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1088 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that the parol
evidence rule applies in negligent-misrepresentation cases because in those cases "a tort cause of
action is being infused into a contractual relationship") with Extra Equipamentos, 541 F.3d at 723
("[E]vidence of what was said in the negotiations that led up to the signing of the release would
not be admissible-in a suit for breach of contract. That is a critical qualification. The parol
evidence rule is a rule of contract law, and a contract integration clause is a privately negotiated
supplement to the rule, and most courts, including, we have assumed (though the matter is not free
from doubt), Illinois, hold that neither the rule nor the clause prevents a disappointed party to the
contract from basing a tort suit on proof that in the course of the negotiations the other party made
fraudulent representations.").
'651 F. Supp. 2d 577, 592 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
' 0 "Thus, it may be, defenses based on the Statute of Frauds, or the contracts statute of
limitations, or the parol evidence rule - all of these being looked at as contract-based defenses -
are no longer available if the underlying theory of liability - section 90 or an analogue - is not
contract theory at all." GILMORE, supra note 59, at 66.
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Statute of Frauds applies; 10 6 (2) the contracts' statute of limitations
applies; 10 7 or (3) a statute providing for attorney's fees for a claim on an
"oral or written contract" applies.10 8
F. Not an Agreement
Obviously, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts regards "promissory
estoppel" as a form of contract, but not as a form of agreement.' 09
Chapter 3 of the Restatement (Second), entitled "Formation of Contracts
- Mutual Assent", begins with Section 17, which provides:
§ 17. Requirement of a Bargain
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the formation of a
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation
of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.
(2) Whether or not there is a bargain a contract may be
106 Compare In re Brandeis Lofts, L.L.C., No. BKO7-80482-TLS, 2009 WL 2501113, at *6
(Bankr. D. Neb. July 21, 2009) ("[T]he statute of frauds does not bar a claim of promissory
estoppel in a situation where a contract never arose.") with Collins v. Ace Mortgage Funding,
L.L.C., No. 08-cv-01709-REB-KLM, 2009 WL 1796067, at *8 (D. Colo. June 23, 2009) ("[The
statute of frauds has been found to bar promissory estoppel claims . . . .").
107 Compare Huhtala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 N.W.2d 640, 644 (Mich. 1977) (stating that a
promissory estoppel claim is governed by the six-year contracts statute of limitations and not the
three-year torts statute of limitations) with Ambulatory Infusion Therapy Specialist, Inc. v. N. Am.
Adm'rs, Inc., 262 S.W.3d 107, 119 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ("The statute
of limitations for a breach-of-contract cause of action is four years. Likewise, the statute of
limitations for promissory estoppel is four years." (citation omitted)); MBank Abilene N.A. v.
LeMaire, No. C14-86-00834-CV, 1989 WL 30995, at *14 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr.
6, 1989, no writ) ("MBank also asks that we apply the two year statute of limitations because
promissory estoppel is like fraud, which is a tort. In our view the promissory estoppel element of
this case derives from the action on the contract. As such, promissory estoppel cannot be
separated from its foundation, which is breach of contract." (citation omitted)).
1os Compare Preload Tech., Inc. v. AB & J Constr. Co., 696 F.2d 1080, 1093-95 (5th Cir.
1983) (applying Texas law) (relying on language in Williston's treatise on contracts and Comment
d to Restatement (Second) Section 90 to conclude that promissory estoppel claims should be
treated as contract claims for purpose of the Texas attorney's fee statute) with Doctors Hosp.
1997, L.P. v. Sambuca Houston, L.P., 154 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, pet. abated) ("[S]ection 38.001(8) cannot include a promissory estoppel claim. Were we to
hold otherwise, we would have to (1) ignore a long line of cases holding that a recovery under
promissory estoppel means no valid contract existed and (2) add a cause of action that the statute's
plain language does not include. We intend to do neither of these.").
"1See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981).
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formed under special rules applicable to formal contracts or
under the rules stated in § § 82-94."o
Comment b then explains that "the two essential elements of a bargain"
are "agreement and exchange."'' Accordingly, under Restatement
(Second) Section 17(2), a "contract may be formed" under Restatement
(Second) Section 90, even though there has been no "bargain," i.e., no
"agreement."' '
2
Further support for the conclusion that promissory estoppel is not a form
of agreement is provided by the illustrations to Restatement (Second)
Section 90." For example, "A promises B not to foreclose, for a specified
time, a mortgage which A holds on B's land. B thereafter makes
improvements on the land. A's promise is binding and may be enforced by
denial of foreclosure before the time has elapsed.""14  While there is
reliance by B, there is no "bargain" between A and B - no "agreement."" 5
II. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Now that we have considered promissory estoppel, let's focus on the
parol evidence rule. We will see that just as the words "promissory
estoppel" are not always helpful in understanding what promissory estoppel
is and is not, the words "parol evidence rule" are not always helpful in
understanding what the parol evidence rule is and is not. The "parol
evidence rule" is not limited to "parol," is not evidence law, and is not a
single rule.
A. History
We know much more about the history of the parol evidence rule than
we do about the history of promissory estoppel, but there is a lot more
history to know. The classic evidence treatises of James B. Thayer and
110M.
" Id. §17 cmt. b.
1l2Id. § 17(2).
1
3 See id. § 90 cmt. b, illus. 2.
1l41d.
" Cf Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2009) ("A
more fundamental problem with a reliance theory is that the normative connection between
reliance and contract is often debatable. Reliance may exist in cases where the defendant never
entered into a voluntary obligation."). [We are using the ambiguous introductory signal "Cf."
because we are never sure that we fully understand articles that use words like "normative."]
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John Henry Wigmore provide the most complete (and completely
contradictory) explanation of the Roman law origins of the rule." 6
Contracts scholars tend to trace the parol evidence rule's origins back to
The Countess of Rutland's Case."'7 While Countess of Rutland does state
that "[i]f other agreement or limitation of uses be made by writing, or by
other matter as high or higher, then the last agreement shall stand; for every
contract or agreement ought to be dissolved by matter of as high a nature as
the first deed," the case hinges on (1) facts that are possibly limiting and
(2) a possibly troublesome rationale." 8
The case concerns a transfer of land.1 9 More accurately, it concerns
multiple transfers of the same piece of land by the same person.12 0 Edward
Earl of Rutland, an apparently well-regarded lawyer, created a problematic
set of documents-willing his property, Eykering, by one document to his
wife, the Countess, and by a second document to "heirs males of the body
of Thomas Earl of Rutland," his father.121 By these contradictory
documents Edward's nephew, Roger, stood to take Eykering, because he
had been granted the property the day after the Countess.1 22  Thus,
essentially what is involved are serial testamentary gifts, and in such
situations, the later will is always determinative of the testator's intent.12 3
The Countess wanted to use the oral testimony of trustees to the
documents to prove that Edward really meant to give the property to her at
his death.12 4  In holding that the Countess was barred from using such
evidence, the court stated, "[i]f other agreement or limitation of uses be
made by writing, or by other matter as high or higher, then the last
16 Compare generally JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
AT THE COMMON LAW 393 (1898) with 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2426, at 3411 (1905).
11777 Eng. Rep. 89 (K.B. 1604). See, e.g., Juanda Lowder Daniel, KIS.S. The Parol
Evidence Rule Goodbye: Simplifying the Concept of Protecting the Parties' Written Agreement,
57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 227, 233 (2007); Lawrence M. Solan, The Written Contract as a Safe
Harbor for Dishonest Conduct, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 91 n.7 (2001).
'18 Countess ofRutland, 77 Eng. Rep. at 90.




123For an excellent discussion of this case, see Professor Bill Long's self-published history of
the case at The Parol Evidence Rule, Early History I, The Countess of Rutland's Case (1604)
(Dec. 21, 2005), http://www.drbilllong.com/Sales/PERH.htnl (last visited Mar. 6, 2010).
124See Countess ofRutland, 77 Eng. Rep. at 89-90.
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agreement shall stand; for every contract or agreement ought to be
dissolved by matter of as high a nature as the first deed."1 2 5 This language
effectively linked Countess of Rutland to the parol evidence rule.
It is of some relevance that the case involved a transfer of land, a type of
contract traditionally within the province of the Statute of Frauds. One
reason provided by Coke's report that parol evidence should not be
admitted was that "it would be dangerous to purchasers and farmers, and all
others in such cases, if such nude averments against matter in writing
should be admitted."1 26 This statement can be viewed in two ways. On the
one hand, this line of reasoning can be seen as extending the parol evidence
rule beyond land transfers and into commerce. However, it makes more
sense, since the case regards a land transfer, that the statement was meant to
emphasize the notion of certainty of title. It seems more likely from the
context of the facts that the court was concerned that third parties - people
who were not a party to the contract - might be misled if the writing was
not considered paramount. This is not the concern of the parol evidence
rule today.
Additional criticism can be found in Thayer's evidence treatise, where
the Countess ofRutland is further dismissed:
[T]he Countess of Rutland's case ... merely applied a rule
as to the declaration of the uses of fines; namely the
doctrine briefly stated in Jones v. Morley, that if the fine be
levied pursuant to a covenant declaring the uses, one cannot
set up an intervening oral declaration of uses, or deny the
uses declared in the covenant; unless, indeed, there be an
intervening declaration by "other matter (than the
covenant), as high or higher."l 2 7
Thayer goes further, using the language of the case that "it would be
dangerous to purchasers and farmers, and all others in such cases, if such
nude averments against matter in writing should be admitted"l 2 8 to make the
point that the case also fails to make the necessary discrimination that it is
the use of extrinsic evidence, and not the proving of it, that is made
12sId. at 90.
1261d.
127THAYER, supra note 116, at 401.
128 Countess ofRutland, 77 Eng. Rep. at 90.
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objectionable by the parol evidence rule. 12 9 Seen in this way, the case fails
to establish the parol evidence rule as substantive contract law.
Even more problematic in Countess of Rutland is the other explanation
for the decision to disallow the use of oral testimony to verify the
agreement made prior to the writing, concerns of that testimony's basis in
slippery memory."o130 While the complicated conveyances in this case
were indeed made twenty-four years prior to the litigation, analysis of the
uncertainty of testimony is more consistent with evidence law concepts than
contract law concepts, other than, perhaps, the contracts concept of the
Statute of Frauds, where a writing is paramount in a real estate transaction
to prevent enforcing false claims to an interest in land based only an alleged
oral agreement.
B. Parol Evidence Rule as Contract Law
Notwithstanding any ambiguity in the statements from Countess of
Rutland, there is no ambiguity in more modem day statements, omissions,
and restatements. The recent statement from the El Paso Court of Appeals
in Adams v. McFadden - "The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive
contract law, not evidence" - is representative.131
Professor E. Allan Farnsworth makes the most persuasive argument as
to why the parol evidence rule should be treated as a rule of substantive
contract law and not evidence:
Admittedly, the [parol evidence] rule is exclusionary,
making certain kinds of evidence inadmissible. But this
does not make it a rule of 'evidence,' for it is not based on
the idea that the evidence excluded is 'for one or another
reason [an] untrustworthy or undesirable means of
evidencing some fact to be proved.' Rules of evidence,
such as the hearsay rule, bar some methods of proof to
show a fact but permit that fact to be shown in a different
way. In contrast, the parol evidence rule bars a showing of
129THAYER, supra note 116, at 401.
130 See 2 E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.2, at 212-13 (2d ed.
1998).
13'296 S.W.3d 743, 751 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2009, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.).
See also Academic Imaging, L.L.C. v. Soterion Corp., No. 08-3577, 2009 WL 3805807, at *6 (6th
Cir. Nov. 13, 2009); In re Marine Energy Sys. Corp., No. 07-1506, 2008 WL 4820128, at *7 n.1
(4th Cir. Nov. 6, 2008).
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the fact itself - the fact that the terms of the agreement are
other than those in the writing.13 2
The Federal, Texas, and Uniform Rules of Evidence make no mention
of the parol evidence rule. No evidence casebooks or student aids mention
the parol evidence rule. Contracts casebooks and student aids devote a
significant number of pages to the parol evidence rule. So does the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
C. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
The Restatement's provisions on parol evidence have not been
extensively used by appellate courts in Texas. On January 17, 2010, we 33
did Westlaw searches of the Texas cases database using the search
instructions "parol evidence," and then "parol evidence" and "Restatement"
and "Contracts" in the same paragraph. From January 2000 through
January 17, 2010, 418 Texas appellate court decisions used the term "parol
evidence,"'34 but only five of those cases also mentioned the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. In discussing parol evidence issues, Texas courts
use the words "exclude" and "evidence" rather than the Restatement's
words "discharge" and "prior agreements." 3 5  While Texas courts in
applying the parol evidence rule do not expressly look to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts' provisions and use a different terminology from the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the positions taken in Texas cases look
like the positions take in the Restatement.' 36
1322 FARNSWORTH, supra note 130, § 7.2, at 212. Professor Farnsworth also explains away
the Countess ofRutland's "slippery memory" rationale. See id. at 212-13.
133"We" in this instance is the "royal we"- in other words, Epstein.
Out of curiosity, we also did a Westlaw search for Texas cases that use the phrase "parole
evidence." Since 2000, forty-four Texas appellate court decisions used the "parole evidence"
misspelling. Worse, nine of those opinions used both "parol evidence" and "parole evidence" in
the same paragraph. None of the forty-four cases mentioned, much less misspelled, the
Restatement of Contracts.
135E.g., Rowan Cos. v. Wilmington Trust Co., No. 14-07-00465-CV, 2009 WL 3210936, at
*15 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 8, 2009, pet. filed) ("[T]he parol evidence rule, it
excludes 'only evidence of. . . .'); Noell v. Crow-Billingsley Air Park Ltd. P'ship, 233 S.W.3d
408, 417 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied) ("The parol evidence rule excludes evidence
of .... ).
136See 14 WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III ET AL., TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 210A.29[1][a]
(2009) [Professor Dorsaneo's books are an incredible resource for law students and lawyers]. But
cf David R. Dow, The Confused State of the Parol Evidence Rule in Texas, 35 S. TEX. L. REV.
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Section 213 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, set out below, is
subtitled "Parol Evidence Rule":
§ 213. Effect of Integrated Agreement on Prior Agreements
(Parol Evidence Rule)
(1) A binding integrated agreement discharges prior
agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them.
(2) A binding completely integrated agreement discharges
prior agreements to the extent that they are within its scope.
(3) An integrated agreement that is not binding or that is
voidable and avoided does not discharge a prior agreement.
But an integrated agreement, even though not binding, may
be effective to render inoperative a term which would have
been part of the agreement if it had not been integrated.137
In reading Section 213, you should have noticed:
(1) The phrase "parol evidence" appears only in the title.1
The phrase "parol evidence" does not appear in the
language of Section 213 or in the language of any other
Restatement section.139
(2) And, instead of describing which evidence is not
admissible, the section describes which "agreements" are
"discharged." 4 0
(3) Even though the phrase "Parol Evidence Rule" is a part
of the title of Section 213, the section has multiple rules.141
Section 213(1) discharges prior agreements only to the
457, 462 (1994) (criticizing Texas courts' use of the parol evidence rule in contract interpretation
cases).
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981).
138 id.
1
39 But see id § 213 cmt. a. (This Comment is entitled "Parol evidence rule." This is the only
mention of "parol evidence" in the comments).
140 d. § 213. See also id. § 213 cmt. a (explaining that Section 213 "renders inoperative prior
written agreements as well as prior oral agreements").
1
41See id. § 213 (1981); Scott J. Burnham, The Parol Evidence Rule: Don't Be Afraid of the
Dark, 55 MONT. L. REv. 93, 99 (1994) ("[T]he rule can be said not to be a rule at all. It is a
cluster of concepts, used for a variety of purposes. It also looks unlike a rule because it is so
riddled with exceptions, some of which are expressed in the statement of the rule itself.").
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extent that the prior agreements are "inconsistent" with the
integrated agreement.142 Section 213(2) is a different rule;
it only applies if the integrated agreement is a "completely
integrated agreement," in which case Section 213(2)
discharges all prior agreements. 143
And, if you were to read other Restatement sections, you would find
still other rules relating to prior agreements.144 For example, Section 214
provides in part:
§ 214. Evidence of Prior or Contemporaneous Agreements
and Negotiations
Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous
with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to
establish ...
(d) illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration,
or other invalidating cause;
(e) ground for granting or denying rescission, reformation,
specific performance, or other remedy.145
Under Section 214 and consistent case law and commentary, the "parol
evidence rule does not apply when the remedy of rescission or reformation
is sought as a result of a misrepresentation."l 46 A popular student guide,
Emanuel's Contract outline, provides an easy illustration:
Example: After numerous meetings and discussions,
Buyer buys an apartment building from Seller. The
contract contains a standard 'merger' clause ... reciting
that the contract constitutes the sole agreement between the
parties. Buyer later discovers that Seller has lied about the
profitability of the property, and sues to rescind the deal.
The parol evidence rule will not prevent Buyer from
showing that Seller made fraudulent misrepresentations to
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213(1). See id. § 209 (defines "integrated
agreements").
143Id. § 213(2). See id. § 210 (defines "completely integrated agreements").
'"See id. § 214.
145 id
146 Still v. Cunningham, 94 P.3d 1104, 1110 (Alaska 2004). See also E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.4, at 429 (4th ed. 2004).
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induce him to enter into the contract. 147
The Emanuel hypothetical, like many law school hypotheticals, is
somewhat theoretical and incomplete. As a matter of legal theory, the
Buyer's rescission suit should not be unsuccessful because of the parol
evidence rule. The parol evidence rule should not prevent the trier of fact
from determining whether Seller lied about the profitability of the property
prior to the execution of the contract of sale.
The applicability of the parol evidence rule is not, however, the only
legal issue raised by the Emanuel hypothetical. And, it is not the
determinative issue. The Buyer's rescission suit probably will still be
unsuccessful. Buyer's rescission because of misrepresentation requires that
the trier of fact find that, notwithstanding the contract language, Buyer did
rely on the misrepresentation and that Buyer was justified in relying on the
misrepresentation. 14 8
Regrettably, some courts describe a ruling that Buyer's reliance on
earlier oral promises was not justified due to the language of the written
contract as a ruling based on the parol evidence rule. Consider, for
example, the following statement by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in Crowell v. Campbell Soup Co.:149
[1] The district court found that the alleged promises were
completely contradicted by the terms of the written
contract, thereby rendering any reliance by the Growers on
those promises unreasonable. [2] Based on Minnesota's
parole evidence rules, the district court therefore prohibited
the introduction of any evidence of the alleged oral
promises and granted summary judgment in favor of
Herider on the Growers' claims.
[3] We agree with the district court that any reliance by
the Growers on the three alleged oral promises made by
Herider was unreasonable as a matter of law because each
of the alleged oral promises plainly contradicted the terms
147 STEVEN L. EMANUEL, CONTRACTS 181 (8th ed. 2006). While far more people read
Emanuel and Gilbert's outlines than the Baylor Law Review, or the SMU Law Review for that
matter, this is the first law review article to quote from Emanuel.
148 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981) ("upon which the recipient
is justified in relying").
149264 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2001).
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of the written contract. 50
The Growers had asserted "fraud, misrepresentation and rescission
claims" based on statements made before the written contract.'51 Reading
statement [3] in conjunction with statement [1], we understand that the
Growers' reliance on oral statements contradicted by a later writing was
unreasonable as a matter of law. That is understandable and reasonable.
What is not understandable is statement [2] which is not only
unnecessary to the holding but also both a misspelling and a misapplication
of the "parol evidence rule." In rescission actions, evidence of pre-contract
misrepresentations is admissible to show an "invalidating cause."l 5 2
Statement [2] is inconsistent with Restatement (Second) Section 214 and
with the law in Texas and elsewhere.
As the Texas Supreme Court ruled in Dallas Farm Machinery v.
Reaves:
Writ of error was granted in this case on two of thirty
points of error contained in petitioner's application. The
two points pose the question of whether parol evidence is
admissible, in the face of a 'merger' clause in a written
contract, to establish that the contract was induced by
fraud. We hold it is.153
In Reaves, the buyer sought rescission of a written contract for the sale of a
crawler tractor and loader, alleging that the seller orally misrepresented the
work capabilities of the tractor and loader and that he relied on the
misrepresentations in entering into the contract. 15 4  The Texas Supreme
Court found support for its ruling that the parol evidence rule does not
apply to actions for misrepresentation based on rescission in a decision by
the Massachusetts Supreme Court155 and in McCormick and Ray's
treatise.
s oId. at 762 (footnotes omitted).
152 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 cmt. c.
'307 S.W.2d 233, 233 (Tex. 1957).
'4Id. at 234.
B55 ates v. Southgate, 31 N.E.2d 551, 558 (Mass. 1941) (holding that the parol evidence rule
"does not stand in the way of recession for fraud").
1562 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK & ROY R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE, CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL § 1644 (2d ed. 1956) ("[I]t is only when the oral expressions are relied on as warranties, that
is, as parts of the contract, as being obligations intentionally assumed, that the Parol Evidence
[Vol. 62:2424
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D. Purpose of the Parol Evidence Rule
Professor Marvin Chirelstein provides a helpful explanation of the
purpose of the parol evidence rule:
The purpose of the rule is apparent. Since the completion
and execution of a written contract is typically the
concluding point in the bargaining process, one's ordinary
expectation is that the document itself will contain all the
conscious and important elements of the deal. . . . The
parol evidence rule assumes that the formal writing reflects
the parties' minds at a point of maximum resolution and,
hence, that duties and restrictions that do not appear in the
written document, even though apparently accepted an
earlier stage, were not intended by the parties to survive.1 7
Professor Michael B. Metzger sees a different purpose. Throughout his
article on the parol evidence rule and promissory estoppel, he connects the
parol evidence rule with the Statute of Frauds. The following statement is
representative: "The parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds, as
mentioned earlier, are strikingly similar. The same underlying policies
support both doctrines: prevention of perjury by excluding presumptively
untrustworthy oral testimony and the desire to give judges increased control
over the jury." 5 8
Generally, reported cases apply the parol evidence rule without
expressly addressing the purpose of the parol evidence rule. Nonetheless,
there is some case support for Professor Metzger's position. An
intermediate appellate court in Tennessee stated in Lyons v. Farmers
Rule applies. If they are relied on as misrepresentations and the theory of recovery or defense is
fraud, then the Parol Evidence Rule is clearly without application. On the latter proposition there
has been some apparent wavering in Texas cases where the writing contained a disclaimer of
warranties, or 'merger clause.' Yet even here the sounder authority seems to admit extrinsic
agreements for the purpose of avoiding the instrument for fraud.").
157 MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
98 (5th ed. 2006). See also CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain
Meaning Rule, Contractual Merger Clause, and the CISG, 17 PACE INT'L L. REV. 61, 72 (2005)
("Though the Parol Evidence Rule does not apply to contracts governed by the CISG, similar
policy considerations are incorporated into the CISG itself. The principal purpose of the Parol
Evidence Rule is to respect the importance the parties may have accorded to their writing. Under
the Convention as well, a writing constitutes an important fact of a transaction - it must be
assumed to fulfill a function, otherwise it would not have been employed.").
158Metzger, supra note 2, at 1454.
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Insurance Exchange, "[O]ne of the reasons for the parol evidence rule is to
prevent fraud in presenting oral defenses to written agreements ... Thus,
the parol evidence rule is a 'quasi-statute of frauds' . . . ."59
The only modem Texas appellate court decision that expressly attributes
a purpose to the parol evidence rule, Pan American Bank of Brownsville v.
Nowland, describes the purpose of the parol evidence rule as follows: "The
conceptual essence of the parol evidence rule is to prevent fraud, therefore,
exceptions to the rule are equally well recognized when enforcement of the
rule would be inequitable or result in fraud." 6 0  A law review note
discussing Nowland and related Texas cases concludes: "Thus the policy
considerations encompassed by the parol evidence rule are similar to those
of the statute of frauds."' 6 1
And, as we suggested earlier, The Countess of Rutland's Case, the 1604
"case that is considered to have established the parol evidence rule," 62
relied in part on a rationale that is consonant with the Statute of Frauds:
"[I]t would be inconvenient, that matters in writing made by advice and on
consideration, and which finally impart the certain truth of the agreement of
the parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by
the uncertain testimony of slippery memory."l'6 3
While there is this case support for viewing the parol evidence rule in
statute of frauds terms, such a view is, at best, an incomplete view. Unlike
the Statute of Frauds, the parol evidence rule is not limited to oral
agreements. The parol evidence rule reaches prior written agreements as
well as prior or contemporaneous oral agreements,164 but it does not reach
oral (or written) agreements that are after, not prior to, the written
agreement. 16 5 And in misrepresentation cases such as Campbell Soup, the
' 26 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
'650 S.W.2d 879, 885 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Raren S. Guerra, Note, DTPA Precludes Use ofMerger Doctrine and Parol Evidence Rule
in Breach of Warranty Suit: Alvarado v. Bolton, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 373, 384-85 (1989).
162 Hila Keren, Textual Harassment: A New Historicist Reappraisal of the Parol Evidence
Rule with Gender in Mind, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 251, 259 (2006).
163 Countess ofRutland, 77 Eng. Rep. 89, 90 (K.B. 1604).
16"Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co. v. Iowa Midland Supply, Inc., No. 06 C 00845, 2010 WL
181585, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2010). See also Quicksilver Res., Inc. v. CMS Mktg. Servs. &
Trading Co., No. 2-03-251-CV, 2005 WL 182951, at *5 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 27, 2005,
pet. denied) (using the phrase "oral or written parol evidence"). But cf BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1227 (9th ed. 2009) ("parol" means "oral or unwritten").
165 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 108 (6th ed. 2009) ("The
[parol evidence] rule does not apply to subsequent agreements."). However, in F.D.I.C. v. Perry
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question is whether the reliance on the oral statement is reasonable, not
whether the oral statement is a fraud.16 6 As Professor E. Allan Farnsworth
concluded, "Now the conceit that the parol evidence rule is rooted in the
relative unreliability of testimony based on 'slippery memory' in contrast
with the 'certain truth' afforded by a writing has fallen from favor." 6 1
Professor Chirelstein's view of the purpose of the parol evidence rule
seems more consistent with the parol evidence rule's historic origins and
contract law context. And, the purpose and historic origins of the parol
evidence rule along with the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provisions
and Texas case law on the parol evidence rule, like the purpose and historic
origins of promissory estoppel, are instructive in answering the question of
whether the parol evidence rule applies to the promissory estoppel cases.
III. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND PAROL EVIDENCE
There are basically two different fact patterns that might raise the
question of whether the parol evidence rule applies to promissory estoppel
cases:
(1) Oral or written promise, then reliance on this oral or
written promise before the integrated agreement (i.e., final
written contract), then integrated agreement.
(2) Oral or written promise, then integrated agreement, then
reliance on the pre-integrated oral or written promise in
entering into the integrated agreement, or reliance after the
integrated agreement.
In both fact patterns, the critical issue should be the reasonableness of the
Bros., 854 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Tex. 1994), the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas held that the bank breached an oral contract regarding loan renewal. Id. at 1256,
1265. In so holding, the court found the parol evidence rule did not preclude evidence of the oral
agreement for loan renewal because it took place after, rather than prior to, the written loan
agreement. Id. at 1278. On appeal, without acknowledging or disputing the oral agreement took
place after the written loan agreement, the Fifth Circuit stated "based on certain oral promises,
Perry Brothers contends that Nationsbank may be held liable for its refusal to renew Perry
Brothers's loan agreement. We agree, however, with Nationsbank that the parol evidence rule
prevents Perry Brothers from contradicting the clear written terms of the loan agreement, which
left the renewal decision to Nationsbank's discretion." Nationsbank v. Perry Bros. Inc., No. 94-
40630, 1995 WL 581536, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 1995).
'66See Crowell v. Campbell Soup Co., 264 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 2001).
167 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 130, at 213.
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reliance, not whether the parol evidence rule "discharges" or makes
inadmissible evidence of the oral promise.
A. Reliance, then Integrated Agreement
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Clark is an example of the first fact pattern
category: oral promise, then reliance on the promise before the integrated
agreement, then the integrated agreement.'68  Steve Clark, a Marine,
dropped his World Life policy that had a war risk exclusion clause and
signed a written application for a Prudential policy in reliance on a
representation by Brumell, a Prudential agent, that the Prudential policy
would not have a war risk exclusion.169 Clark's written application made no
mention of the agent's representation as to non-war risk exclusion, and the
Prudential policy, issued after Clark was already in Vietnam, contained a
war risk exclusion.o7 0 The Fifth Circuit looked to promissory estoppel to
enforce agent Brumell's promise that the Prudential policy would include
war-risk coverage:
The doctrine of Section 90 is known as promissory
estoppel.... It requires affirmative action indicative of a
desire to be contractually bound. In the case at bar, that
affirmative action manifested itself when the agent,
Brumell, promised to obtain a policy without the exclusion
clauses and thereby induced Steve to drop his other policy
in reliance upon that promise.
... [A]pplication of promissory estoppel in no way
trammels upon the parol evidence rule. Involved here is a
separate enforceable promise and not a variance or
modification of the terms of the policy."'
Justice Sweeney of the Ohio Supreme Court provided a clearer
18456 F.2d 932, 936 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Florida law, which had not previously applied
promissory estoppel).
' 69 Id. at 934.
170 id.
7 1 Id. at 936-37. See also Gregory Scott Crespi, Clarifying the Boundary Between the Parol
Evidence Rule and the Rules Governing Subsequent Oral Modifications, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
71, 79 (2008) ("agreement would be formed by the initial act of reliance, making the later
acceptance redundant and of no legal consequence").
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explanation as to why the parol evidence rule has no application to a
promissory estoppel action based on reliance that preceded the integrated
agreement:
[A] claim based on promissory estoppel does not
contravene the parol evidence rule.
... Under such a theory, the plaintiff asserts an
independent claim for damages based on detrimental
reliance. Courts confronting such a claim focus on "a
promissory commitment centering on the promisee's right
to rely, and the promisor's duty to prevent (or not cause)
harmful reliance which was reasonably foreseeable by the
promisor. The right to rely arises from promissory
statements, assurances, and representations that show
sufficient commitment to induce reasonable reliance in
another." Whether the reliance is objectively reasonable
and foreseeable is a jury question. Thus, the integration
clause in the agreement holds no significance for the
promissory estoppel claim. Instead, what is involved is a
separate enforceable promise and not a variation or
modification of the agreement. Therefore, the subsequent
execution of an integration clause does not preclude a claim
based on detrimental reliance that occurred before the
execution of that clause.17 2
While Justice Sweeney's statement is clear, the procedural context in
which the statement was made is apparently confusing. In Rucker, the Ohio
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as "improvidently accepted."173 The
above quotation is from Justice Sweeney's opinion dissenting from the
court's decision to dismiss.174 Accordingly, we viewed these words as just
the words of Justice Sweeney. A recent Ohio court of appeals decisions has
a different view. In Millersport Hardware, Ltd. v. Weaver Hardware Co.,
the court preceded its use of the language we quoted above with the
statement: "The court's reasoning is instructive."175
Whether Justice Sweeney's or the Ohio Supreme Court's, the reasoning
172Rucker v. Everen Sec., Inc., 811 N.E.2d 1141, 1142-43 (Ohio 2004) (citations omitted).
171Id. at 1141.
174Id. at 1142-43.
'75No. 08-CA-86, 2009 WL 4761560, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2009).
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from Rucker would have been "instructive" to the Eighth Circuit panel that
decided Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc., the case that
inspired the hypothetical at the beginning of this article.,7 6 Let's use the
court's statement of facts relating to Simmons' promissory estoppel claim:
Simmons contends that HPN orally promised a long-term
business relationship on more than one occasion, and that
Simmons relied upon those promises when it expanded its
facilities in 1995 and 1996 to produce "low ash" poultry
meal. The district court held that the alleged oral promises
of a long-term relationship were barred by the parol
evidence rule, UCC § 2-202, because Simmons had
subsequently entered into written one-year contracts. 7 7
The Eighth Circuit then affirmed the grant of summary judgment for HPN
on the ground of the parol evidence rule.17 8
Wrong reasoning, if not wrong result. If, prior to the integrated
agreement, all of the elements necessary for Simmons' recovery for
promissory estoppel were established, why should a later writing prevent
Simmons' recovery of reliance damages on its promissory estoppel claim?
Remember, recovery for promissory estoppel, like the tort remedy of
misrepresentation and the contract remedy of rescission, is based on
reliance, not on an agreement.179
Just as in tort misrepresentation cases and contract rescission cases,
getting past summary judgment motions and prevailing at trial in
promissory estoppel cases based on a promise made prior to an integration
should turn on the reasonableness of the reliance, not on the parol evidence
rule. And, if, as in the Simmons case, the reliance came before the written
agreement, the possibility exists that a fact finder concludes that the reliance
was reasonable.
B. No Reliance Prior to the Integrated Agreement
If, on the other hand, the facts are that there was no reliance on the
promise prior to the integrated agreement other than entering into the
integrated agreement, then a promissory estoppel claim is likely to be
"6270 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 2001).
1"Id. at 727 (emphasis added).
'78 Rd
17 e RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (198 1).
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dismissed or resolved by summary judgment. Even Patty Hewes would
have a hard time convincing a finder of fact that the plaintiff employee
reasonably relied on an oral promise of a long term employment when he
entered into an employment contract that provided for termination on thirty
days notice. 80
These are essentially the facts that the Seventh Circuit faced (without
Patty Hewes) in Mack v. Earle Jorgensen Co. 81 In affirming a directed
verdict for the defendant, the court stated: "[T]he alleged oral agreement or
promise was followed by a written contract, the terms of which are in direct
conflict with the alleged oral agreement or promise. In such a situation, we
seriously doubt whether the promisee could successfully argue that his
reliance on the promise was justifiable, justifiable reliance being 'a
necessary element of promissory estoppel."" 8 2  As stated by Justice
Fairchild in his concurring opinion in Beers v. Atlas Assurance Co.:
"[S]uch denial should be based on the fact that the party did not rely upon
the oral statement, or, if he did, that he was entirely unwarranted in doing
so, and not on an invocation of the parol evidence rule."' 83
In promissory estoppel cases such as Simmons or Beers that involve an
alleged oral promise, denial of the plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim
perhaps can also be denied on the basis of the Statute of Frauds. The
Statute of Frauds is different from the parol evidence rule, and whether the
Statute of Frauds applies to promissory estoppel claims is a different
article.18 4
IV. CONCLUSION
While there is no harm in B-School professors such as Professor
Metzger or law school types like us wrestling with the question whether the
parol evidence rule should apply in promissory estoppel cases (or even the
question whether promissory estoppel should apply in parol evidence
18oPatty Hewes - Damages, http://damagestvshow.wetpaint.com/page/Patty+Hewes (last
visited Mar. 14, 2010).
...467 F.2d 1177, 1178-79 (7th Cir. 1972).
182Id. at 1179.
183253 N.W. 584, 595 (Wis. 1934). Again, in a court of appeals decision with similar facts,
there was a similar statement. Aminian v. Woodward-Clyde Consultants, Inc., No. 01-98-01428-
CV, 2001 WL 493174, at *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 10, 2001, pet. denied) (not
designated for publication) (applying California law).
4Until we write that article, you might look to Maddux, supra note 28, at 209-11.
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cases), judges and practicing lawyers should not be wrestling with this
question. A promissory estoppel case based on a promise made prior to an
integrated agreement should turn on the reasonableness of the alleged
reliance, not on the applicability of the parol evidence rule. To borrow
from Justice Holmes' 85 - sort of - bad law makes hard cases.' 86
'85N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("hard
cases make bad law").
186 As the senior author, I wrote the first draft of this Conclusion. I naively thought that I was
the first to come up with this spin on Holmes' famous statement. As Melinda, Kelly, and Baylor
Law Review editors pointed out, the same phrase was used in the Columbia Law Review in 1951,
Edmond N. Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 838, 847 (1951), and in
numerous other law review articles that do not mention Professor Cahn.
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